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Veil Piercing to Non-Owners:  
A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry 
Mark J. Loewenstein∗ 
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as de-
vices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Limited liability for corporate shareholders
2
 and for members of 
a limited liability company (LLC)
3
 is the default rule in every jurisdic-
tion in the United States.
4
  Under this rule, the “veil” of the entity 
shields its owners from liability for the debts, obligations, and tortious 
conduct of the entity, unless the owner personally guaranteed the ob-
ligations or personally engaged in tortious conduct.
5
  Every jurisdic-
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 1 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
 2 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(a) (2008) (“Unless otherwise provided in 
the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable 
for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable 
by reason of his own acts or conduct.”).   
 3 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303(a), 6B U.L.A. 587 (1996) (“A member 
or manager of [an LLC] is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of 
the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.”). 
 4 See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATING, RIBSTEIN & KEATING ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12:1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
 5 Partners in both limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability li-
mited partnerships, as well as limited partners in limited partnerships (LPs), all enjoy 
limited liability but also theoretically face the prospect of liability through veil pierc-
ing.  There are, however, virtually no cases in which limited liability partners are held 
liable on a veil-piercing theory.  This is likely due to the fact that a creditor desiring 
to reach the assets of, for example, a limited partner in an LP could prevail if the 
creditor could establish that the limited partner participated in control of the busi-
ness.  See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT, § 303(a) (amended 1985), 6B U.L.A. 180 
(2008); see also Zeiger v. Wilf, 755 A.2d 608, 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (de-
scribing “a number of activities which . . . do not constitute participating in ‘the con-
trol of’ a business so as to impose a general partner’s liability on a limited partner”); 
Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v. Woods Mill, Ltd., 210 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) 
(explaining that “[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that a limited partner may not 
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tion, however, has an important judicially created exception to this 
rule; under certain circumstances this veil will be pierced, and the 
owner will be held personally liable.
6
  Precisely what those circums-
tances are has been the subject of numerous court opinions; indeed, 
no issue in corporate law has been litigated more frequently,
7
 and the 
number of cases involving piercing in LLCs has grown rapidly.
8
  Scho-
larly commentators—always on the lookout for meaty topics—have 
not overlooked this, and thus, there are many articles arguing the 
benefits, as well as the detriments, of limited liability and veil pierc-
ing.
9
  Nearly all such articles focus on the entity owner as the party at 
risk when veil piercing occurs.
10
  In fact, these articles simply assume 
that the entity owner is the only party at risk.
11
  Little has been written 
about the risk to other actors in the entity, yet as two recent Colorado 
 
advise with the general partner and visit the partnership business, particularly when 
the project is confronted with a severe financial crisis”).  LLPs will provide courts 
with a new opportunity to apply veil-piercing doctrines, but to date, there are no re-
ported cases doing so.   
While this Article focuses on LLCs and corporations, much of what is written in 
this Article may apply to LLPs as well.  As Bill Callison so perceptively observes, how-
ever, we should be careful before we carry corporate doctrines forward to unincor-
porated entities.  See J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing, 
58 BUS. LAW. 1063, 1072 (2003) (“The entity rationalization movement provides the 
opportunity for scholars, practitioners, and legislators to take a step back and to con-
sider the various rationale for offering limited liability protection to firm owners and 
to determine the extent to which such protection should be given.”). 
 6 See Peter B. Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV 81, 116 (2010). 
 7 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).  
 8 Restricted to the year 2000, there were six cases found in Westlaw using the 
search terms “pierc! the veil” and “LLC.”  In contrast, the same search restricted to 
the year 2008 produced thirty-five cases.  A similar search of LexisNexis turned up 
four cases in 2000 and twenty-three cases in 2008. 
 9 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for all Limited Liability Entities: 
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2001); 
Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2000); David Million, Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 
1305 (2004).  
 10 See, e.g., Robert Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 505, 541 (1977) (“Cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are unified 
more by the remedy sought—subjecting to corporate liabilities the personal assets 
directly held by shareholders—than by repeated and consistent application of the 
same criteria for granting the remedy.”); see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1 (Supp. 2010); Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the 
New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 11 See generally sources in notes 9–10. 
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cases, Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge
12
 and McCallum Family L.L.C. v. 
Winger,
13
 demonstrate, this risk is real.
14
 
This Article focuses on the other actors in the entity and analyz-
es whether they should be liable under a veil-piercing theory.  A con-
sidered discussion of this question, however, must begin with the ra-
tionale for veil piercing in the owner context.  What is the rationale 
for piercing an entity’s veil to reach its owners, and does this ratio-
nale apply with equal force to other actors?  This Article suggests that 
the rationale for holding an owner liable for an entity’s obligations is 
weak at best and weaker still when applied to other actors.
15
 
Part II of this Article proceeds with a brief review of the veil-
piercing doctrine as applied to entity owners.
16
  Next, it considers 
theories under which the LLC manager or corporate officers may be 
liable to the entity’s creditors (both in tort and contract) apart from a 
veil-piercing theory.  This inquiry is important because if alternative 
theories impose liability when, as a matter of public policy, liability is 
appropriate, veil piercing may be superfluous.  In fact, this Article 
demonstrates that this may be the case.  Finally, Part III of this Article 
considers veil-piercing cases involving these other actors and con-
cludes with some observations about veil piercing. 
Preliminary to this inquiry, however, one must consider whether 
it is sensible to consider corporation and LLC cases together.  They 
are, after all, quite different entities.  The LLC is characterized as a 
“contractual entity;” its organizers enter into an operating agreement 
 
 12 211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 13 221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 14 Several other reported cases have dealt with this issue.  See, e.g., Wordtech Sys. 
v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1313 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Faulkner v. Kornman (In re Heritage Org., L.L.C.), 413 B.R. 438, 516 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2009). 
 15 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 515 
(2001) (“The present state of veil piercing doctrine allows judges to impose their 
own brand of rough justice without being overly concerned with precedent or appel-
late review.”). 
 16 Commentary on veil piercing often includes a discussion of “enterprise liabili-
ty,” the theory under which all participants in a single business enterprise ought to 
be liable for the conduct of any one of the participants.  This theory is typically im-
portant in corporate groups, but it may arise in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Da-
niel W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 
1614–15 (1991) (advocating abolishing limited liability for wholly owned subsidiaries 
under some circumstances); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct 
and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 35–40 (1994) (advocating extending liability in the context of the corporate fami-
ly).  See generally PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:9.  Because the focus of this Article is on 
the liability of individual managers of limited liability entities, enterprise liability is of 
no moment and will not be considered further.   
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containing such provisions as to which they agree.
17
  Indeed, a num-
ber of state’s LLC statutes specifically provide that courts should 
honor the “freedom of contract.”
18
  The applicable statute typically 
consists of default rules with very few non-waivable “mandatory provi-
sions.”
19
  In this regard, there are no mandatory “formalities” to which 
those operating the LLC must adhere.
20
 
In contrast to the informality of the LLC and the flexibility of 
LLC acts, corporate statutes contain a number of mandatory provi-
sions and required corporate formalities.  Although there is some 
opt-out flexibility,
21
 corporations typically are required to have a 
board of directors,
22
 hold annual meetings of shareholders,
23
 desig-
nate certain specified officers,
24
 provide minimum notice for share-
holder meetings
25
 and special director meetings,
26
 and establish ap-
praisal rights for shareholders who dissent from certain transactions.
27
  
While corporate law has been trending towards affording greater 
flexibility in the way a corporation structures its affairs, a great deal of 
rigidity exists and is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
28
 
 
 17 See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in De-
laware Limited Partnerships and LLCs, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 221 (2009). 
 18 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1304(a) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter 
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforcea-
bility of operating agreements.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108(4) (2010) (“It is the 
intent of this article to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of con-
tract and to the enforceability of operating agreements.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
18-1101(b) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements.”). 
 19 Common mandatory provisions often relate to members’ access to company 
books and records and the duty of loyalty for those managing the company.  See, e.g., 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b), 6B U.L.A. 596 (1996).  
 20 Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002). 
 21 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 3.10, 57 (2d ed. 
2004); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (2008) (allowing articles of incorpora-
tion to provide shareholders with preemptive rights to purchase unissued shares). 
 22 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2008). 
 23 Id. § 7.01(a). 
 24 ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.483(a) (2011) (requiring each corporation to have a 
president, secretary, and treasurer). 
 25 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.05(a). 
 26 Id. § 8.22(a). 
 27 Id. § 13.02(a). 
 28 Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 453, 466 (1997) (noting that many jurisdictions have “produced a hybrid corpo-
rate code that pleases neither those who advocate shareholder protection nor those 
who prefer complete freedom of contract”). 
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As discussed below, the failure to follow corporate formalities of-
ten looms large in corporate veil-piercing cases.
29
  This failure sug-
gests, at least to courts, that the shareholder did not treat the corpo-
ration as a separate legal entity and paves the way for the court to do 
likewise.  As LLCs have only self-imposed formalities, if any, the fail-
ure to adhere to formalities cannot logically be a factor in deciding 
whether the veil of an LLC should be pierced.
30
  This, however, has 
not proven to be a barrier in the LLC veil-piercing cases.
31
  Instead, 
the courts have focused on other facts, indicating that the LLC own-
ers did not treat the LLC as a separate legal entity.
32
  This doctrine 
may bleed back into corporate veil-piercing cases, but this remains to 
be seen.  As the law stands currently, except for the continuing im-
portance of the formalities test in corporate cases, the articulated veil-
piercing tests for corporations and LLCs are substantially the same.
33
  
Thus, this Article considers veil piercing for incorporated and unin-
corporated entities together. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF VEIL PIERCING 
A. The Traditional Rubric: The “Privilege Theory” 
Although courts have considered whether a shareholder may be 
held liable for a corporation’s debts since at least the 1800s,
34
 Profes-
sor Maurice Wormser first popularized the phrase “piercing the cor-
porate veil” in the early 1900s.
35
  Professor Wormser argued that the 
issuance of a corporate charter is a “privilege” granted by the state 
 
 29 See discussion infra Part II. 
 30 Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002). 
 31 See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., 274 B.R. 768, 775 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“‘[M]embers’ or ‘managers’ of an Illinois [LLC] cannot be 
held liable for the mere failure to observe corporate formalities or repayment, but 
nothing in the statute bars piercing of the ‘corporate veil’ for other grounds on 
which that may be done for ordinary corporations.”); Bonner v. Brunson, 585 S.E.2d 
917, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “[i]n the absence of any evidence that 
[defendant] abused the form of the LLC by commingling or confusing LLC business 
with his personal affairs, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismiss-
ing the claim that [defendant] was personally liable for the alleged debt of the 
LLC”). 
 32 See, e.g., Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009).  
 33 See Oh, supra note 6, at 84; see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC 
Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063 (2006) (examining sixty-one 
LLC veil-piercing cases up to and including 2005). 
 34 See, e.g., Booth v. Bunce, 33 N.Y. 139 (1865).  
 35 PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1.5 (2009) (citing Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of 
Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (1912)). 
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and that, if abused, that privilege (or at least its grant of limited liabil-
ity for the shareholders) can be revoked.
36
 
The privilege theory assumes that a corporation has the respon-
sibility to operate in accordance with the public interest, strictly pur-
suant to the purpose for which the charter was granted.
37
  Under this 
theory, if the corporation is operated in a way that is “counter to the 
spirit” of the privilege granted, its existence can be ignored.  Profes-
sor Wormser wrote that: 
Since the element of personality is an extraordinary privilege con-
ferred upon the corporation by the law, and involves the em-
ployment of a fiction, it follows that “it must be used for legiti-
mate business purposes and must not be perverted,” and, just as 
night follows day, so the courts should and will disregard this fic-
tion “when it is urged for an intent or purpose not within its rea-
son and policy.”
38
 
In support of this view, Professor Wormser discussed People’s 
Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder.
39
  This case involved an attempt by Afri-
can-American citizens to avoid the racially restrictive covenants on va-
cant property by forming a corporation to acquire the property and 
build an amusement park for people of color.
40
  The court held that 
the covenant was not breached because the corporation was an “ar-
tificial person” with “a distinct existence—an existence separate from 
that of its stockholders.”
41
 
Professor Wormser argued that the court erred in the decision 
because it “entirely overlook[ed] that the sole purpose of organiza-
tion of the corporation was obviously to evade and circumvent the 
title restriction forbidding negroes from taking the land.”
42
  There-
fore, because the formation of the corporation was an abuse of the 
incorporation privilege, the court should have disregarded the fic-
tion.  Professor Wormer’s dictum was consistent with United States v. 
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., a 1905 opinion that has been fre-
quently quoted: 
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general 
rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but when 
 
 36 MAURICE WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED 
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 8–9 (1927). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 39 61 S.E. 794 (Va. 1908); WORMSER, supra note 36, at 26. 
 40 Rohleder, 61 S.E. at 794. 
 41 Id. at 796 (internal citation omitted). 
 42 WORMSER, supra note 36, at 27. 
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the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard 
the corporation as an association of persons.
43
 
Justice Cardozo adopted a somewhat more nuanced approach to 
veil piercing in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Company.
44
  In Berkey, the 
court considered an attempt by a personal injury claimant to pierce 
the veil of a street-car company to reach its owner, a corporation that 
owned all of the company’s stock.
45
  What is so instructive about this 
case is that the court assumed that if it held the parent company lia-
ble for the torts of its subsidiary, it would have the legal effect of treat-
ing the two companies as one.
46
  That, in turn, would mean that the 
parent corporation was operating a railroad without the authority to 
do so because New York law required any operator of a railway fran-
chise to obtain the prior approval of the Public Service Commission; 
and furthermore, lack of approval was a criminal offense.
47
  Only the 
subsidiary had the necessary approval to operate the line on which 
the plaintiff was injured.
48
  Although the lack of approval was not at 
issue, Justice Cardozo treated the case as though it were, thus imply-
ing that piercing cannot be considered only in light of the claim at 
issue.
49
  Rather, the opinion implies that a court should ignore a cor-
poration’s separate existence for purposes of satisfying a tort claim 
only if it would ignore that separateness for all purposes.  This more 
holistic approach to veil piercing is instructive.  It requires a court to 
consider what a decision to pierce says about the pierced entity and 
the party being held liable under a piercing theory.  Though fre-
quently cited for its compelling language,
50
 the nuanced approach of 
Berkey has been eclipsed by a more formalistic approach to veil pierc-
ing.  Typically, courts have operationalized the notion of “abusing the 
corporate privilege” with tests or factors to determine, in a rather rote 
 
 43 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 
1905). 
 44 155 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1927). 
 45 Id. at 915. 
 46 See id. (“The acceptance of that conclusion would reduce the statute to futility.  
The defendant, if it uses or operates its subsidiary’s route, is either a coadventurer or 
a principal or at least a licensee.”). 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: 
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 109 n.81 
(2001) (noting that Berkey is “one of the most frequently cited opinions” in the veil 
piercing context). 
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fashion, whether the “corporate privilege” has been abused.  Al-
though there is some variation from state to state and from opinion 
to opinion, commonly this approach employs two tests: (1) whether 
the controlling shareholder and the corporation are alter egos of one 
another, or, in other words, whether the controlling shareholder 
dominated the corporation so that it had no separate existence of its 
own; and (2) whether justice requires ignoring the corporate fiction 
because it is utilized to perpetrate a fraud or injustice.
51
  Some courts 
add a third test: whether an equitable result will be achieved by disre-
garding the corporate form.
52
  It would be an odd case, however, 
where the first two tests are satisfied but the third is not.  Moreover, 
the equitable aspect of the piercing doctrine
53
 has the effect of pro-
viding a post-hoc rationalization for the apparently haphazard way in 
which the doctrine is applied.
54
 
Under the first test, courts often consider whether corporate 
formalities such as the creation of a board of directors, the appoint-
ment of corporate officers, and the maintenance of corporate bank 
accounts and records have been observed.
55
  The absence of such ac-
 
 51 See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (“First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the sepa-
rate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no 
longer exist; and second, circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of 
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”); Mic-
ciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. 1986).  
[I]f it is shown that shareholders used the corporate entity as a mere 
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs without regard 
to separate and independent corporate existence, or for the purpose of 
defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpe-
trate a fraud or wrong on another, equity will permit the corporate 
form to be disregarded and will hold the shareholders personally re-
sponsible for the corporation’s improper actions. 
Micciche, 727 P.2d at 373. 
 52 See, e.g., Phillips v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc., 139 
P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) (“Third, the court must evaluate whether an equitable 
result will be achieved by disregarding the corporate form and holding the share-
holder personally liable for the acts of the business entity.”).  
 53 See, e.g., Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 
411 (Conn. 1982). 
 54 See, e.g., Thomson v. L.C. Roney & Co., 246 P.2d 1017 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). 
 55 Courts have identified a number of factors relevant to the first test; one fairly 
comprehensive list is presented in Assoc. Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 806, 813–15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (internal citations omitted): 
[1] Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds 
of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate 
funds or assets to other than corporate uses; [2] the treatment by an 
individual of the assets of the corporation as his own; [3] the failure to 
obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; [4] 
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tions indicates that the controlling shareholder is not respecting the 
corporation as a separate legal entity and supports a judicial decision 
to ignore it as well.  Under this test, courts also consider whether the 
entity has been adequately capitalized—although, technically, ade-
quate capitalization has little to do with corporate separateness.
56
  Ca-
pitalization does, however, have salience in the second test, which in-
quires into the consequences of piercing the veil.  But this second test 
is reached only if the first test is satisfied. 
The second veil-piercing test typically is not a major hurdle to a 
plaintiff’s recovery.  Of necessity, a plaintiff has already proven that 
the owners did not respect the separate existence of the entity—that 
is, the owners have abused the privilege granted to them by the 
state—and that the plaintiff’s claim has not been paid.  A “fraud or 
 
the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the 
debts of the corporation; [5] the failure to maintain minutes or ade-
quate corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the sepa-
rate entities; [6] the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; 
[7] the identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domina-
tion and control of the two entities; [8] identification of the directors 
and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and man-
agement; [9] sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one 
individual or the members of a family; [10] the use of the same office 
or business location; [11] the employment of the same employees 
and/or attorney; [12] the failure to adequately capitalize a corpora-
tion; [13] the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitaliza-
tion; [14] the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or 
conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another 
corporation; [15] the concealment and misrepresentation of the iden-
tity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, 
or concealment of personal business activities; [16] the disregard of le-
gal formalities and the failure to maintain arm’s length relationships 
among related entities; [17] the use of the corporate entity to procure 
labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity; [18] the 
diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other 
person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of 
assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in 
one and the liabilities in another; [19] the contracting with another 
with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield 
against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of 
illegal transactions; [20] and the formation and use of a corporation to 
transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity. 
Id. 
 56 Nevertheless, there is some authority for the idea that inadequate capitaliza-
tion alone is sufficient to justify piercing.  See PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:9 (citing cas-
es from California).  As Professor Clark notes, however, state legislatures could 
mandate minimal initial capitalization for corporations and what he calls “capital 
maintenance rules” to protect involuntary corporate creditors.  See Robert Clark, The 
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 551–52 (1977); see also 
William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 
U. PITT. L. REV. 868–69 (1982) (developing the same idea). 
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injustice” would result, some courts have said, if the plaintiff’s claim 
remains unpaid.
57
  In an oft-cited case, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, the 
creditor was a lessor, and the corporate debtor, the lessee, was with-
out assets.
58
  This lack of capitalization, together with the fact that the 
individual defendant bought no stock, made no capital contributions, 
kept no minutes, and elected no officers, was sufficient to justify 
piercing the corporate veil.
59
  The fraud or injustice would seem to be 
simply nonpayment.  One court has said that creating a corporation 
to avoid personal liability “constitutes the type of injustice” that satis-
fies the second test.
60
 
Analysis in the LLC context follows a similar pattern, with courts 
focusing on the extent to which the owners treated the LLC as a sep-
arate entity.
61
  Because “formalities” are not an issue in the operation 
of an LLC,
62
 courts generally focus on other factors, such as the use of 
the entity’s bank accounts to pay personal expenses, failure to main-
tain separate records, use of common facilities by the owners and the 
company, and inadequate capitalization.
63
  If the plaintiff establishes 
that the entity is so dominated, the court turns its attention to the 
second test where, as in corporate cases, the plaintiff is likely to pre-
vail.
64
 
Courts and scholars often consider a second doctrine in concert 
with veil piercing—the law of agency.  Under this doctrine, the own-
ers of an entity may be held liable for the entity’s obligations in both 
tort and contract if the entity is an agent of the owners because, un-
der traditional agency principles, the principal is liable for the obliga-
tions if the agent was acting within the scope of its employment.
65
  
This is not, strictly speaking, veil piercing because it does not turn on 
 
 57 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. West Dixie Enters., Inc., 190 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 
1999) (noting, with reference to the second test, that funds siphoned out of the cor-
poration by the shareholders were “unavailable to meet [the corporation’s] remedial 
obligations”). 
 58 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 59 Id. at 212–13. 
 60 Autrey v. 22 Tex. Servs. Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
 61 See generally Ann K. Wooster, Construction and Application of LLC Acts—Issues Re-
lating to Personal Liability of Individual Members and Managers of LLCs as to Third Parties, 
47 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2009) (collecting cases). 
 62 See Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002); West-
meyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 63 See Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 313 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002). 
 64 See id. (Second, the court “consider[s] whether the court properly found that 
Mary Ann Howell used that control and dominance to perpetrate a wrong.”). 
 65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2006). 
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factors such as whether corporate formalities were followed or 
whether there was adequate capitalization.  Yet when applying agency 
principles, courts often look to these factors, perhaps because a key 
factor in determining whether one is an agent of another is the de-
gree of control exercised over the purported agent.
66
  If a corporation 
or LLC does not have the indicia of a separate entity—a functioning 
governing body, separate bank accounts, etc—it is more likely that it 
was subject to the domination and control of its owners.  Neverthe-
less, the agency theory generally is confined to instances in which the 
owner is an entity—typically a corporation—and the agent is a wholly 
owned subsidiary.
67
  While there are other theories rationalizing veil 
piercing, the “privilege theory” has been dominant.
68
 
 
 66 See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) 
(holding that lender’s control over debtor was sufficient to render the debtor an 
agent of the lender).  
 67 See, e.g., Henry v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC, No. 1999/0036, 2007 WL 6030275, at 
*8 (D.V.I. Aug. 10, 2007) (“In Delaware, [a] court can pierce the corporate veil of an 
entity . . . under an agency theory where the parent exercises dominion over the sub-
sidiary. . . .  Thus, [agency theory] require[s] the parent corporation to exercise a 
certain degree of control over the subsidiary that would warrant piercing the corpo-
rate veil.”) (citations omitted). 
 68 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 56, at 541 (arguing that veil piercing is employed by 
the courts when other doctrines, principally, fraudulent conveyance, are found lack-
ing and moral precepts support denying limited liability for an entity’s owner).  In 
addition, some courts tweak the traditional two-factor test to develop what has been 
called the “instrumentality rule” and the “identity rule.”  PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., 
BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS §§ 6.02–06, 10.03 (Aspen Pub. 2009) (addressing 
“instrumentality” and “identity” doctrines).  See also Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F. 
Supp. 976, 987–88 (D. Conn. 1991) (comparing the two rules).  The former is a 
three-factor test requiring proof of  
“(1) [c]ontrol, not mere majority or complete stock control, but com-
plete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business prac-
tice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to 
this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of 
its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the defendant to 
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or 
other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention 
of plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach 
of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained 
of.”   
Litchfield, 799 A.2d at 312–13 (quoting Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Pav-
ing, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 410 (1982)).  The identity rule is a two-factor test:  
If a plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and owner-
ship that the independence of the corporations had in effect ceased or 
had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity 
would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the econom-
ic entity to escape liability arising out of an operation conducted by 
one corporation for the benefit of the whole enterprise. 
Id. at 315 (quoting Tomasso, 447 A.2d. at 411).  It would appear that the identity rule 
is more appropriate in the parent-subsidiary context, but the tests are not materially 
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Piercing can occur in both tort and contract cases.
69
  Arguably, 
the case for the former is more compelling than the latter.  After all, 
the creditor in a contract case chose its debtor and had an opportuni-
ty to assess the ability of the debtor to discharge its obligations.  The 
tort victim typically does not enjoy that luxury.  Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that contract creditors, sometimes called voluntary creditors, 
are at least as successful as tort creditors, or involuntary creditors.
70
  
In either case, the judicial focus on “formalities” makes little sense 
because there is no causal connection between the failure to observe 
some level of formality and the loss to the creditor.  Yet, as Professor 
Thompson’s data indicate, formalities clearly matter—courts pierce 
the corporate veil in two-thirds of the cases in which it is found that 
the individual defendant failed to observe corporate formalities, and 
courts decline to pierce in over ninety percent of the cases in which 
there was a finding that formalities were observed.
71
  These factors, 
combined with the apparently random nature of veil piercing, have 
prompted calls for its elimination as a legal doctrine.  Professor Ste-
phen Bainbridge, in an exhaustive analysis, concluded that no persu-
asive justification for the doctrine could be identified.
72
 
B. Economic Analysis 
When an entity bears the consequences of torts committed by its 
agents, it can insure against those torts and/or capitalize the entity 
sufficiently to bear those costs.  Some have argued that the owners of 
the entity, or certain senior managers, should bear these costs if the 
entity cannot, so as to deter entities from being undercapitalized or 
underinsured and externalizing these costs to tort creditors.
73
  This 
externalization is commonly characterized as a moral hazard—”the 
incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky activi-
ties to creditors.”
74
  Such proposals, however, are problematic.  To 
 
different.  In any event, in the Litchfield case the court found that both tests had been 
satisfied. 
 69 See, e.g., John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 20 (2010) (providing data regarding court pierc-
ing statistics for both contract and tort cases). 
 70 See Thompson, supra note 10, at 1050. 
 71 Id. at 1063–65. 
 72 Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 514. 
 73 See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Lia-
bility for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 396 (2004) (pertaining to senior 
managers); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Lia-
bility for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1990–1991) (pertaining to entity owners). 
 74 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 104 (1985). 
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start, the risk of personal liability would naturally discourage invest-
ment in business entities if investors risk liability,
75
 and employment, 
if managers bear the risk.  This is a social cost that must be weighed 
against the presumed social benefit of limiting the externalization of 
risk.
76
  Second, it is not altogether clear that businesses systematically 
under-invest in avoiding loss.
77
  Indeed, businesses risk the investment 
of their owners if they under-invest in safety measures and insurance.  
Moreover, managers whose investment in the firm consists not only 
of any equity they may own but also of the human capital they have 
invested have a strong incentive to protect that human capital by in-
suring against risks.
78
  Owners and managers also have reputations to 
protect, and under-investment that results in uncompensated clai-
mants places those reputations at risk.  Finally, and apart from repu-
tational harm, managers and owners may recognize a moral obliga-
tion to compensate those injured by the entity that they manage or in 
which they invest and thus capitalize and/or insure the firm appro-
priately. 
Of equal importance is the question of who is the more efficient 
risk bearer.
79
  For some risks, it may be the case that an injured party 
is better able to insure against the risk and to do so at a lower cost.  
Expanding the liability of owners and managers for such risks under 
some notion of veil piercing would, of course, be economically ineffi-
 
 75 Id. at 91; see also William H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 371, 371 (1981) (“The purpose of limited liability is to promote commerce and 
industrial growth by encouraging shareholders to make capital contributions to cor-
porations without subjecting all of their personal wealth to the risks of the busi-
ness.”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. 
REV. 259, 262 (1967). 
 76 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 104 (“Externalization of risk imposes 
social costs and thus is undesirable.”).  But see PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:7 (arguing 
that investors are focused on the amount of potential returns from an investment, 
not the potential liability).  Professor Presser also argues that the costs of monitoring 
that would arise from unlimited liability are manageable and not, alone, a reason for 
limited liability.  Id. § 1:7, at 1-39. 
 77 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 104 (“[T]he magnitude of the exter-
nality under limited liability has been exaggerated.  As Richard Posner has demon-
strated, there is no externality with respect to voluntary creditors.  In addition, firms 
have incentives to insure for amounts greater than their existing capital.  The insur-
ance company becomes a contract creditor, reducing the externality.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 78 Id. at 107 (“A firm with insurance against tort claims is less likely to become 
bankrupt, and thus less likely to impose costs on managers and other employees.  In-
surance thus induces people to make firm-specific investments of human capital.”). 
 79 Id. at 101–02 (“In some circumstances creditors might have a comparative ad-
vantage in assessing the riskiness of a transaction initially and superior ability to mon-
itor the conduct of the firm for the duration of the agreement.”). 
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cient.  Moreover, even in those instances in which the entity was the 
most efficient risk bearer and, ex ante, under-invested in safety and 
insurance, we must consider whether a broad rule that imposes liabil-
ity on individuals is warranted.  Such a rule may cause owners and 
managers to over-invest in precautionary behavior and insurance so 
as to avoid uncompensated, or under-compensated, injury to relative-
ly few injured parties. 
Professor Timothy Glynn, in a recent article, seeks to overcome 
these concerns by arguing that imposing vicarious liability on senior 
officers for an entity’s torts is justified because they are the most effi-
cient risk bearers and “are in the best position to monitor and avoid 
risks.”
80
  Managerial aversion to risk and the risk of over-deterrence 
are not concerns under his approach because such officers are now 
part of a mobile “managerial class” and that mobility means that their 
human capital investment is therefore reduced.
81
  Professor Glynn al-
so argues that over-deterrence “will be constrained by their incentive-
based compensation, the equities markets, controlling shareholder 
oversight, and other factors.”
82
  But these responses miss the mark for 
several reasons.  First, only officers of publicly held corporations are 
part of any managerial class.  Officers in closely held entities may 
have a considerable human capital investment in their firms, which 
makes them risk averse.
83
  Of equal importance, the degree of human 
capital one has invested in his or her firm and the extent to which 
that investment motivates the manager to be risk averse is entirely 
separate from the affect of potential personal liability.  One’s human-
capital investment may not affect one’s aversion to risk, but liability 
surely will. 
Second, it seems doubtful that any mix of compensation and 
other factors could adequately compensate for the risk of unlimited 
liability in many settings.
84
  The only obvious contractual undertaking 
that would compensate for the risk is a right to indemnification by 
the firm.  Of course, such a right already exists as a matter of agency 
 
 80 Glynn, supra note 73, at 334. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461, 1472 (1989). 
 84 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Proce-
dural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 434 (1992) (“Making officers and directors perso-
nally liable may create undesirable incentives to be too cautious, may drive capable 
people away from such jobs, and may provide inadequate compensation if complete 
insurance coverage is not available.”). 
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law,
85
 and if, somehow, the law were to impose vicarious liability on 
managers, contractual indemnification would become the norm. 
Finally, and most importantly, one might question Professor 
Glynn’s premise that officers are efficient risk bearers.
86
  This view as-
sumes that senior officers should be vicariously liable, as is an em-
ployer under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
87
 because a senior 
officer is “the person most able to prevent the tortious conduct and 
spread the risk.”
88
  But often, that is simply not the case.  In complex 
businesses—and many closely held entities operate such businesses—
it is unrealistic to expect any officer to be able to assess the risk and 
monitor the activities of numerous employees and other agents.  With 
regard to tortious conduct, which is the focus of Professor Glynn’s 
proposal, injured plaintiffs do have a claim against the wrongdoer 
and possibly against the person or persons who had a duty to super-
vise or control the wrongdoer.
89
  By assumption, then, Professor 
Glynn’s theory of vicarious liability for officers only applies when the 
officer did not have the responsibility to monitor the tortfeasor. 
By comparison, traditional notions of respondeat superior im-
pose liability on an employer in part because the employer hired the 
wrongdoer and was in the best position to monitor and control his or 
her performance.
90
  An officer is not necessarily in that position, and 
the risk of vicarious liability would deter non-owners from agreeing to 
serve as managers or would result in their retention at a higher level 
of compensation.  If one were committed to identifying natural per-
sons within a firm to bear liability, the logical persons would be the 
board of directors or other governing body of the firm.  Imposing vi-
carious liability on that body, however, would radically change its re-
sponsibilities and composition.  That is, perhaps, why no one has ever 
suggested that, as a matter of public policy, boards should be perso-
nally liable for the tortious conduct of a firm. 
 
 85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (2006). 
 86 Glynn, supra note 73, at 334. 
 87 This is the doctrine under which liability is imposed upon an employer for the 
acts of his employees committed in the course and scope of their employment.  3 AM. 
JUR. 2D Agency § 261 (2011).  
 88 Glynn, supra note 73, at 335. 
 89 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding profes-
sional athlete liable for negligent supervision of his bodyguard); Estate of Country-
man v. Farmers Coop. Ass’n, 679 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 2004) (holding manager liable 
for negligent supervision); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 (2006). 
 90 See, e.g., Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 858 (8th 
Cir. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
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Conventional economic analysis generally recognizes that a re-
gime of limited liability is economically efficient and exceptions to it 
ought to rest on a sound basis.  For instance, Professors Frank Easter-
brook and Daniel Fischel considered the appropriateness of veil 
piercing in their article on limited liability, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation.
91
  They argue that limited liability for corporations is justi-
fied because it facilitates trading in corporate shares and business di-
versification by corporate managers.
92
  Thus, veil piercing does, and 
ought to, occur “where limited liability provides minimal gains from 
improved liquidity and diversification, while creating a high probabil-
ity that a firm will engage in a socially excessive level of risk taking.”
93
  
This is, of course, most likely in close corporations, which account for 
all veil-piercing cases.
94
  There are no reported cases in which share-
holders of a publicly held, or even a widely held, corporation were 
held liable on a piercing theory. 
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel then assert that veil piercing 
is more appropriate in cases involving tort than in cases involving 
contract because voluntary creditors can protect themselves while in-
voluntary creditors cannot.
95
  Moreover, the moral hazard problem 
exists with respect to involuntary creditors because they do not have 
the ability to assess the risk that they face and, thus, cannot price it 
accordingly.
96
  But Professors Easterbrook and Fischel maintain that 
even voluntary creditors should be able to pierce the veil when they 
have been misled as to the entity’s financial situation because, under 
those circumstances, they cannot accurately assess the risk.
97
  This 
view might be questioned, as the actors who misled the creditor 
should be personally liable on a theory of fraud or, at least, negligent 
misrepresentation.  In either case, the piercing remedy would seem 
to be superfluous. 
Finally, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that underca-
pitalization should be a basis for piercing for both voluntary and invo-
 
 91 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74. 
 92 Id. at 96–97. 
 93 Id. at 109. 
 94 See Oh, supra note 6, at 110 (“Veil-piercing claims prevail exclusively against 
close corporations.”). 
 95 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 112. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 106.  While not mentioned in their article, arguably veil piercing is inap-
propriate under those circumstances because the creditor should have an indepen-
dent tort claim arising out of the misrepresentation, and this claim would be valid 
against any individuals who made the misrepresentation. 
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luntary creditors.
98
  With respect to the former, they argue that credi-
tors, particularly smaller trade creditors, should be able to assume 
that firms have adequate capitalization, which they define as “an 
amount of equity that is within the ordinary range for the business in 
question,” and can pierce the veil if it is inadequate, unless such in-
adequacy was disclosed.
99
  They note that the firm is in a better posi-
tion to assess its capitalization than are its creditors.
100
  As to involun-
tary creditors, it would follow a priori that if veil piercing is 
appropriate for voluntary creditors in the event of undercapitaliza-
tion, it is more appropriate for involuntary creditors. 
The problem with this rather generous view of veil piercing is 
that judging the adequacy of a firm’s capitalization is no easy matter.  
Using the rubric of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, one might ask 
what the “ordinary range” of capitalization is in any business.
101
  
Should the question be litigated, the parties would likely be limited to 
expert testimony, which would surely be in conflict.  The problem is 
particularly acute because the judgment is made in retrospect, after 
the liability has been incurred and after the judgment against the ent-
ity has been returned unsatisfied.  Moreover, this view of veil piercing 
raises a thorny fairness problem—why should the shareholders of in-
adequately capitalized closely held entities risk personal liability while 
those in publicly held entities do not?  Would this not discourage in-
vestment in closely held entities and thereby result in a social cost?  
Finally, allowing veil piercing on the basis of undercapitalization 
alone would generate a delicate question of damages: Should the re-
covery be limited to the amount that plaintiff would have recovered if 
the entity had been adequately capitalized, even if that amount is less 
than the plaintiff’s loss?  This recognizes, of course, that even well-
capitalized entities suffer financial reversals and the inability to pay 
their debts.  This is perhaps why veil piercing on the basis of under-
capitalization alone is rare, if not nonexistent.
102
 
 
 98 Id. at 113. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 113. 
 102 See BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, 
AND POLICY 220 (2008) (“[A]s case law shows, inadequate capitalization alone is rare-
ly sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.”); Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 521 (observ-
ing the “courts’s well-nigh universal refusal to treat undercapitalization, standing 
alone, as dispositive”); Glynn, supra note 73, at 355 (“The mutual exclusivity of li-
mited shareholder liability and ‘undercapitalization’ is why no court, to my know-
ledge, has pierced based on this factor alone.”). 
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Consistent with this view, Professor Stephen Presser has observed 
that the concept of limited liability for corporate shareholders arose 
in the nineteenth century to encourage less wealthy but enterprising 
entrepreneurs to create new businesses.
103
  The creation of new busi-
nesses continues to be an important societal goal, and the centrality 
of limited liability continues to be a legislative priority.  The last few 
decades have seen the advent and dramatic growth of the LLC, now 
the predominant form of new business in America.
104
  Moreover, state 
legislatures have afforded limited liability for partners in general 
partnerships by providing the option of a limited liability partner-
ship,
105
 and for general partners in limited partnerships through the 
limited liability limited partnership.
106
  These developments send a 
message that limited liability is a legislative priority that should not be 
undercut by judicial exceptions. 
C. Summary 
The economic analysis of veil piercing ignores the standard ru-
bric of veil-piercing language and instead focuses more broadly on 
whether limited liability is economically efficient.  Under this view, 
whether the entity was meticulous in its record keeping is irrelevant.  
The third party who suffered a loss, whether in contract or tort, is not 
protected from that loss by any such formalities.  Rather, what is rele-
vant for contract creditors is the extent to which the entity provided 
misleading information and, for tort creditors, the extent to which 
the entity adequately insured itself against loss.  But the veil-piercing 
doctrine, although recognizing that such considerations are relevant, 
has proceeded instead on a formalistic basis.  The results of applying 
the formula are unpredictable, which accounts for the large body of 
litigation on the issue. 
For well-advised companies, veil piercing is thus easy to avoid.
107
  
It seems fair to conclude, then, that the doctrine has a punitive aspect 
 
 103 Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, De-
mocracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 155–56 (1992). 
 104 “The number of new LLCs formed in America in 2007 now outpaces the num-
ber of new corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to one.”  Rodney D. 
Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New 
LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs 
Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010).  In 
several “bellwether” states such as Delaware and Colorado, over three new LLCs are 
formed for every one new corporation formed.  Id. 
 105 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997). 
 106 UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (2001). 
 107 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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and a deterrent effect.  The message to entity organizers is clear: if 
you seek limited liability, take care to treat the entity you formed as a 
separate entity, on pain of personal liability.  Thus, to the extent that 
moral hazard exists, it is inadequately addressed by the traditional 
rubric.  A survey of reported veil-piercing cases conducted by Profes-
sor Robert Thompson disclosed that courts pierce the corporate veil 
about 40% of the time that such a claim is asserted,
108
 but surprisingly, 
courts do so more often in contract cases than in tort cases.
109
  In fact, 
tort claimants successfully pierced the veil in just 31% of the cases,
110
 
compared to 42% for contract claimants.
111
  The data suggest that de-
terring moral hazard may not be a large factor in piercing decisions.  
In addition, while the proof of misrepresentation was highly corre-
lated with a decision to pierce,
112
 misrepresentation was a factor in on-
ly 169 cases, or about 10% of the pool of cases.
113
  This suggests that 
the strongest basis for piercing in contract cases was rarely present. 
In short, the basis for holding the owners of any entity liable for 
the entity’s obligation is thin, resting on formalism with little atten-
tion paid to the economic consequences of limited liability.  The pri-
vilege doctrine, which is the underlying basis for the veil-piercing 
tests, is itself difficult to rationalize.  It is founded on little more than 
the assertion that if the owner of the entity does not respect its sepa-
rate existence, then neither should the courts.  In the decades since 
Professor Wormser posed that argument, the incorporation process 
has become increasingly simplified and available as a matter of 
right.
114
  Organizing an LLC is similarly quite easy.
115
  Finally, even if 
operating as a corporation or LLC could fairly be characterized as a 
privilege, it does not follow that failing to adhere to formalities con-
stitutes an “abuse” of that privilege or that a claimant should be able 
to reach the personal assets of the owners.  A more logical result from 
a finding of abuse would be that the “privilege” should be revoked by 
the state but not retroactively.  Section 14.30(a)(1)(ii) of the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) authorizes the court to dissolve a 
 
 108 Thompson, supra note 10, at 1048. 
 109 Id. at 1058. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1063 (Piercing occurred in 94% of the cases in which the presence of mi-
srepresentation was cited by the court.). 
 113 Id. 
 114 BRANSON ET AL., supra note 102, at 5. 
 115 All that is necessary is a simple filing, typically called “Articles of Organization” 
and containing minimal information about the entity, with the Secretary of State.  See 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 202–03 (1996). 
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corporation if “the corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the 
authority conferred upon it by law.”
116
  Thus, because the statutory 
drafters have provided a remedy, judicial veil piercing is arguably un-
authorized.
117
 
In addition, the privilege notion of corporate law is of question-
able value in characterizing limited liability entities.  Many scholars 
and commentators view corporations (and, by extension, all limited 
liability entities) as a “nexus of contracts.”
118
  That is, the entity ought 
not be characterized as a separate legal person but rather as a series 
of separate contracts, both implicit and explicit, among and between 
the various actors within the firm and providers of goods and services 
from outside the firm.
119
  Under this view, the corporate or other li-
mited liability entity statute merely provides default rules.  The par-
ties can contract around these default rules, but for the sake of effi-
ciency, the default rules ought to be those that the parties would 
likely agree to were they to bargain over them.  While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to provide an analysis of whether limited liability 
is the appropriate default rule under this contractarian approach, two 
observations are in order.  First, all corporate codes and LLC acts 
provide that limited liability is a default rule, so it is implicitly a part 
of all dealings between the entity and third parties.  Second, sound 
analysis supports the idea that this default rule is efficient for both 
publicly held and closely held entities and in both contract and tort 
settings.
120
 
Veil piercing raises yet another fundamental question, this one 
of prudential importance: Do courts exceed their prudential role 
when grafting a remedy onto a statute?  This question should be con-
sidered in light of other provisions in the corporate code and LLC 
acts that address the equitable concerns that underlie the veil-
piercing doctrine.  Most veil-piercing cases, whether concerning cor-
porations or LLCs, involve situations in which the owners of the enti-
 
 116 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(1)(ii) (1984). 
 117 But cf. Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002). 
 118 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (1989). 
 119 See generally BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND 
OPERATION 31–41 (1997) (summarizing nexus of contracts theory); FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1996); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History in Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1395 (1989). 
 120 Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 485–507. 
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ty have distributed entity assets to themselves, leaving the entity una-
ble to pay its obligations to creditors.  The entity statutes, as well as 
other provisions of federal and state law, discussed below, deal direct-
ly with this situation.
121
  Taken together, these provisions provide a 
legislative solution to the most common problem addressed in veil-
piercing cases. 
The idea, however, that state courts act without jurisdiction, or at 
least unadvisedly, when grafting equitable remedies onto a state sta-
tute is not widely accepted.
122
  While federal courts are limited in their 
ability to create common law,
123
 the conventional wisdom is that state 
courts are not.
124
  This Article challenges this conventional wisdom, at 
least in the context of business association statutes.  The statutes are 
crafted to balance the interests of the various constituencies of the 
entity—owners, managers, and third parties dealing with the entity—
regarding the rights and obligations of the owners and managers.  A 
business association statute serves no other purpose, and it arguably 
pre-empts the field on the issues it resolves.  Judicial decisions that al-
ter this balance by allowing a creditor to pierce the veil of an entity 
and hold an owner liable result in legislative push-backs,
125
 add trans-
action costs as parties seek to contract around the judicial incur-
sion,
126
 or create uncertainty and additional litigation.
127
  This is un-
 
 121 See discussion infra Part III. 
 122 See Zechariah Chafee Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 
1065, 1092 (1949); Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 86, 88 (2009).  
 123 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  See generally Note, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 853 (1982) (discussing state alter ego laws and the inability of federal common 
law to disregard the corporate entity). 
 124 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.  
 125 In response to Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986), a case in 
which the Texas Supreme Court announced a broad test for veil piercing, the Texas 
legislature amended its corporate code to drastically limit the doctrine.  The court in 
Castleberry held that to pierce the corporate veil, a claimant need only show construc-
tive fraud, which the court defined as “the breach of some legal or equitable duty 
which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency 
to deceive others, to violate a confidence, or to injure public interests.”  Id. at 273.  
The legislative response is in section 21.223(b) of the Texas Business Organizations 
Code, which provides that a claimant must prove that a shareholder “caused the cor-
poration to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual 
fraud on the [claimant] primarily for the direct personal benefit of the [sharehold-
er].”  TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (2009).  See generally Elizabeth S. Miller, 
Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner Liability Protection and Piercing the Veil of Tex-
as Business Entities, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 405, 407–11 (2009) (discussing the statute). 
 126 Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 481. 
 127 Id. 
LOEWENSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  1:28 PM 
860 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:839 
fortunate, as one of the main goals of corporate law is, or at least 
ought to be, to provide predictability so that entrepreneurs can con-
fidently invest.
128
 
It is in this context that this Article considers the wisdom of veil 
piercing to hold non-owners liable.  Before reaching that question, 
the next Part considers the liability of entity managers aside from veil-
piercing claims.  In effect, Part III provides the alternative to veil 
piercing and implicitly asks the question as to whether an additional 
veil-piercing cause of action is needed. 
III. HOLDING MANAGERS LIABLE 
A. Managerial Liability in the Absence of Veil Piercing 
The appropriateness of veil piercing should be considered in 
light of other doctrines that hold entity managers liable for what 
might be characterized as entity obligations.  This Part demonstrates 
that there are several theories on which personal liability attaches and 
raises the obvious question as to whether an additional one—veil 
piercing—serves as critical a function as the courts and supporters of 
the doctrine assume.  Interestingly, in the recent Colorado veil-
piercing cases discussed below, it appears that such a cause of action 
existed; that is, the Colorado courts had ample reasons to hold the 
managers liable without resorting to veil piercing.
129
 
1. Tort Actions 
In tort actions, the most important basis for holding managers 
liable is for their own wrongful conduct, an exception to non-liability 
carved out in corporate and LLC statutes.
130
  For instance, in Weber v. 
U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., a Delaware LLC sent a business solicitation 
via fax to the plaintiff in violation of a federal statute that prohibited 
such solicitations.
131
  Two individuals who owned and operated the 
 
 128 See id. at 514 n.166 (“It is obviously important that the Delaware corporate law 
have stability and predictability.”) (quoting Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 
(Del. Ch. 1974)). 
 129 See infra Part III.B. 
 130 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2) (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
303 cmt. 2 (1996).  See generally 2 LARRY RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND 
KEATINGE ON LLCS §§ 12:1–12.4 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that all LLC acts expressly 
provide that members and managers are not liable for the debts, obligations, or oth-
er liabilities of the LLC, but that this limitation “does not protect the members or 
managers from direct individual liability for their own wrongs, such as torts and pro-
fessional malpractice”). 
 131 924 A.2d 816, 819–20 (Conn. 2007). 
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LLC were named as defendants and prevailed on summary judgment; 
the trial court concluded that they could not be personally liable.
132
  
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that claims under 
the statute “generally are viewed as sounding in tort” and that the in-
dividual defendants, although they purported to act on behalf of the 
LLC, may themselves have violated the statute.
133
 
In some ways, Weber is an easy case—the individual defendants 
were alleged to have actually committed the wrongful act.  A bit more 
attenuated than Weber is the case Estate of Countryman v. Farmer’s Coop-
erative Association, in which the defendant’s wrongful act was more in 
the nature of nonfeasance than misfeasance.
134
  The case arose out of 
a residential natural gas explosion resulting in death.
135
  One of the 
defendants, the manager of the LLC that supplied the propane, was 
alleged to be at least partially at fault for failing to properly warn the 
propane users about the attendant dangers.
136
  This negligence was 
enough, in the court’s view, to hold the manager directly liable to the 
injured parties.
137
 
The Estate of Countryman decision pushes the boundaries of di-
rect liability for managers of a limited liability entity because the de-
fendant, at least arguably, did not have a direct duty to the plaintiffs 
or their decedents.  The manager owed a duty to the LLC that em-
ployed him, and many courts have ruled that an agent is not liable for 
damages to a third party for a breach of the duty that the agent owes 
to the principal.
138
  That is, many courts have drawn a distinction be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance, with the former a basis for liabil-
ity but not the latter.
139
  The principal in the Estate of Countryman—the 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 825. 
 134 See 679 N.W.2d 598, 599–601 (Iowa 2004). 
 135 Id. at 599. 
 136 Id. at 599–600. 
 137 Id. at 605. 
 138 See, e.g., Coker v. Dollar, 846 F.2d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 139 Peguero v. 601 Realty Corp., 873 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (App. Div. 2009) (“The 
‘commission of a tort’ doctrine permits personal liability to be imposed on a corpo-
rate officer for misfeasance or malfeasance, i.e., an affirmative tortious act; personal 
liability cannot be imposed on a corporate officer for nonfeasance, i.e., a failure to 
act.”) (citing Michaels v. Lispenard Holding Corp., 201 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614 (App. Div. 
1960); see also MLM LLC v. Karamouzis, 767 N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 2003).  See gener-
ally 3A WILLIAM FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1161, n.5 (collecting cases).  But see id. at n.9 (collecting contrary 
cases).  Even in New York, however, where the courts have embraced a misfeas-
ance/nonfeasance distinction, the potential liability of corporate and LLC managers 
is far from clear.  In Haire v. Bonelli, 870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (App. Div. 2008), for in-
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supplier of the propane—presumably owed a duty to warn and would 
be liable if it failed to discharge that duty,
140
 but its agents, arguably, 
did not owe such a duty.  By contrast, if the agent had negligently 
damaged the plaintiff’s premises while installing a heater, the agent’s 
liability is clearer; the agent owed a duty to both its principal and to 
the customer to exercise due care while on the customer’s premis-
es.
141
  Nevertheless, the trend of the law seems to be in the direction 
of eliminating the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance 
in determining the liability of an agent,
142
 and the court in Estate of 
Countryman did not even discuss the issue. 
2. Contract Actions 
Corporate codes, LLC acts, and statutes that regulate “fraudu-
lent transfers” all provide direct statutory claims against managers of 
limited liability entities and also often provide a remedy otherwise 
sought in a veil-piercing case.
143
  For instance, corporate codes and 
LLC acts prohibit the distribution of entity assets to owners if the ent-
ity is insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the distribution,
144
 
and a director or manager who authorizes a distribution in violation 
of these sections is liable to the entity for the amount of the distribu-
tion in excess of what the statute allows.
145
  There are procedural bar-
riers in these sorts of provisions, such as the MBCA, which requires a 
 
stance, which arose out of a shooting at a shopping mall, the court refused to dismiss 
a claim against individual defendants who were officers or members of the defendant 
corporations or LLCs.  The plaintiff had alleged that these individual defendants 
“participated in the commission of a tort in furtherance of company business or to 
benefit the business, namely reducing or eliminating mall security to maximize prof-
its.”  Id.  This allegation is fairly close to an allegation of nonfeasance and points out 
the difficulty of distinguishing between the two.  Haire might also be explained as pe-
culiar to the law of property.  See also Gray (ex rel. Rudd) v. Beverly Enterprises-
Mississippi, Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 410 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate 
hands-on contact by the defendants, but such activity does not seem required to im-
pose personal liability under Mississippi law.  One may easily be a direct participant 
in tortious conduct by merely authorizing or negligently failing to remedy miscon-
duct by one’s subordinates.”). 
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (There is a duty to warn end us-
ers of products “known to be dangerous for intended use.”). 
 141 See id. § 284; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 13, 343, 350, 352 
(1958). 
 142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. a (2006) (An “agent’s tort liability 
extends to negligent acts and omissions as well as intentional conduct.”). 
 143 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.4, at 71–74 (1986). 
 144 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
405(a) (1996). 
 145 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 406 
(1996). 
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plaintiff to prove that the director failed to comply with the standard 
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the MBCA.
146
  But 
these barriers reflect a legislative judgment on the circumstances un-
der which an actor in a limited liability entity ought to be liable for 
his or her conduct, a judgment that may be undercut by a judicial 
veil-piercing decision. 
Similarly, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), 
adopted by forty-four states,
147
 gives creditors a remedy when a debtor 
has transferred assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors or has made a transfer of assets or incurred an obligation 
without adequate consideration (termed a “constructively fraudulent” 
transfer under the UFTA), if certain conditions are present.
148
  As in 
the case of recoveries under the entity statutes for improper distribu-
tions, discussed above, there are certain hurdles for a creditor-
plaintiff to clear under the UFTA.
149
  For instance, as the introductory 
note to the UFTA indicates, a transfer that is 
constructively fraudulent because insolvency concurs with or fol-
lows failure to receive adequate consideration is voidable only by 
a creditor in existence at the time the transfer occurs or the obli-
gation is incurred.  Either an existing or subsequent creditor may 
avoid a transfer or obligation for inadequate consideration when 
 
 146 To succeed on a claim that a director or directors made an “unlawful distribu-
tion,” the action must be commenced within two years after the distribution and the 
plaintiff must show that the offending director(s) failed to act in good faith and did 
not reasonably believe the action was in the best interests of the corporation.  See 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984) (“(a) Each member of the board of directors, 
when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (1984) (“(1) the liability of a director . . . is 
barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date.”).  This language in 
section 8.30 codifies in part the “business judgment rule.”  Application of the busi-
ness judgment rule presents a heavy burden of proof for a plaintiff to overcome and 
adversely affects a plaintiff’s chance for success.   
 147 GRANT W. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 250 (2009) (“At least 44 states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
the UFTA.”). 
 148 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (UFTA) § 4 (1984).  If any of the following 
conditions is present, the transfer is deemed to be constructively fraudulent and sub-
ject to recovery by the creditor:   
(1) the debtor was left by the transfer or obligation with unreasonably 
small assets for a transaction or the business in which he was engaged; 
(2) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that he would incur, 
more debts than he would be able to pay; or (3) the debtor was insol-
vent at the time or as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
UFTA, Prefatory Note at 3, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.pdf. 
 149 See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
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accompanied by the financial condition specified in § 4(a)(2)(i) 
or the mental state specified in § 4(a)(2)(ii) 
of the UFTA.
150
  Again, these and other limitations in the UFTA 
may reflect a considered legislative judgment as to when a creditor 
can void a transfer by an entity.  While beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, it is worth noting that the “preferential transfer” provisions of 
federal bankruptcy law also provide a remedy in certain cases.
151
 
A final doctrine is worth considering here: the corporate trust 
doctrine.
152
  This is a judicially created doctrine that imposes liability 
on directors and managers of insolvent entities who favor their own 
interests or claims over the claims of other creditors.
153
  Obviously, 
such transfers may (and likely do) run afoul of the creditor protec-
tions noted above and, to that extent, this doctrine is similar to veil 
piercing.  Like veil piercing, and unlike the statutory doctrines consi-
dered here, the corporate trust doctrine could render a director or 
manager liable to creditors without regard to the amount of the of-
fending distribution.
154
  The doctrine operates in an almost punitive 
manner; an improper distribution renders the director or manager 
liable to the creditor for the amount of the creditor’s claim, even if it 
exceeds the amount of the improper distribution.
155
  For this and 
perhaps other reasons,
156
 creditors may prefer a cause of action based 
on this doctrine over more limited statutory remedies. 
The remedies discussed in this section are not frequently in-
voked.  That is especially true with respect to creditor remedies set 
forth in corporate codes and LLC acts.  Given the availability of the 
much more liberal remedy provided by veil piercing, this is not sur-
prising. 
 
 150 UFTA, supra note 148, Prefatory Note at 3. 
 151 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).  
 152 Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 502 (Colo. 2007); New Crawford Valley, 
Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Colo. App. 1993); James R. Ellis & Charles L. 
Sayer, Trust Fund Doctrine Revisited, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 134 (1949); FLETCHER, 
supra note 139, §§ 7369, 5422. 
 153 See, e.g., In re Mortgage America Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1268–70 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 154 See, e.g., Colborne Corp. v. Weinstein, No. 09CA0724, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 
58 (Jan. 21, 2010), cert. granted, 2010 Colo. LEXIS 606 (Aug. 16, 2010) (No. 
10SC143). 
 155 See Collie v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727, 729 (Colo. App. 1988). 
 156 Statutory remedies often include a statute of limitations.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.33 (1984). 
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B. Managerial Liability under Veil Piercing 
Veil piercing against non-owners has not been universally ac-
cepted by the courts; a number of courts have considered, and re-
jected, a veil-piercing theory to impose liability on non-owners.  An 
early example of a court apparently requiring that a defendant have 
an ownership interest in order to pierce the corporate veil is Riddle v. 
Leuschner, which involved two corporations that were formed by the 
Leuschner family in 1949.
157
  The plaintiff, Riddle, was a creditor of 
one of the corporations and sought to hold the defendants (husband, 
wife, and son) liable, alleging that they were the alter egos of the cor-
poration.
158
  Although the husband was the president of one of the 
corporations and involved in the management of the other corpora-
tion, he did not own any shares in either corporation.
159
  The court 
held that because the husband did not have an ownership interest in 
the corporations or share in their profits, “there was not such unity of 
‘interest and ownership’ between . . . [the husband] and the corpora-
tions” to demonstrate that he was the alter ego of the corporations, a 
necessary finding to pierce the corporate veil.
160
  The court went on to 
hold that the wife’s ownership of one share in one of the corpora-
tions was “sufficient to permit holding her personally liable to credi-
tors of that corporation provided that the alter ego doctrine [was] 
otherwise applicable.”
161
  This small amount of ownership also al-
lowed her to be held liable for the other corporation’s debts because 
the corporations were “controlled, dominated, managed, and operat-
ed by” the family so “that there was no separateness between them 
and the corporations.”
162
 
Because the wife was also liable for the debt of the corporation 
in which she did not hold an ownership interest, it was not entirely 
clear whether an ownership interest is required in California.  Two 
subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions applying California law have held 
that Riddle does require a defendant to hold an ownership interest to 
pierce the corporate veil.
163
  In addition, courts in Ohio
164
 and Louisi-
ana
165
 have also indicated that ownership is a prerequisite to piercing. 
 
 157 335 P.2d 107, 108 (Cal. 1959). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 108–09. 
 160 Id. at 111. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id.  
 163 SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that no matter 
how much control the defendant had over the brokerage, under Riddle, the first re-
quirement of an alter ego relationship did not exist because the defendant did not 
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In contrast to the courts that seem to require an equity owner-
ship interest as a prerequisite to piercing, a number—perhaps a 
growing number—of courts will pierce through the entity’s veil to an 
“equitable owner.”
166
 Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., a 2005 Illinois 
Court of Appeals decision, exemplifies piercing to reach an “equita-
ble owner.” 
167
  Theresa DiCosola was the sole shareholder of TLD, 
but her husband Nicola was the “governing and dominating personal-
ity” of the corporation.
168
  This control gave rise to the conclusion 
that Nicola was TLD’s equitable owner, which, in turn, was sufficient 
 
hold an ownership interest in the brokerage); Firstmark Capital Corp. v. Hempel Fin. 
Corp., 859 F.2d 92, 94–95 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Riddle requires an ownership 
interest be established before a corporation’s obligations may be imposed on the in-
dividual).  But see Logix Dev. Corp. v. Faherty, No. B178872, 2007 WL 1113255, at *6–
11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007), where the court held that Riddle relied primarily on 
the amount of control an individual had and that ownership was simply a factor. 
 164 In Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 905 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio 2009), for instance, the plain-
tiff tried to pierce the corporate veil to hold one corporation liable for another cor-
poration’s debts.  Id. at 615.  The two corporations, Pro-Fab and See-Ann, were 
owned by common shareholders, but neither corporation owned an interest in the 
other corporation.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that he was injured at work because of 
See-Ann’s actions and that Pro-Fab controlled the work site and was the alter ego of 
See-Ann.  Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument because Pro-Fab did 
not hold an ownership interest in See-Ann, and therefore, it was unable to control 
the sister corporation.  Id. at 617.  Thus, the lower court erred in holding a genuine 
issue of material fact remained over whether the plaintiff could pierce the veil of See-
Ann and hold Pro-Fab liable.  Id. at 615. 
 165 Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 577 So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other 
grounds, 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991).  In Riggins, the plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants negligently leveled their house and sought to hold both the corporation’s 
owner and an officer personally liable.  Id. at 1061.  The court reversed the trial 
court’s decision to hold the officer liable because he did not hold an ownership in-
terest in the corporation.  Id. at 1065.  The court reasoned that the purpose behind 
piercing “is to protect a creditor in his dealings with a shareholder who fails to dis-
tinguish, in transactions, between the corporation and his identity as a shareholder.”  
Id.  On that basis, a piercing claim is “not applicable to employees and/or officers 
who are not also shareholders in the corporation.”  Id.  But see Withers v. Timber 
Prods., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. Ct. App. 1991).  Timber Products was pierced and co-
defendant Mr. Maker was held personally liable for its debts.  Id. at 1295.  At the time 
of Timber Products’ incorporation, Maker was the sole shareholder and officer; 
however, he subsequently transferred 100% of his stock to Mr. Johnson, who was a 
judgment-proof convicted felon that had no knowledge or active role in Timber 
Products after the swap.  Id.  Looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” the court 
found that the trial court had not clearly erred in finding Maker the alter ego of 
Timber Products despite his apparent lack of ownership.  Id.  But it is important to 
note that the record contained no evidence of the transfer, so precedential value of 
the case is weak. 
 166 See, e.g., Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 
412 (Conn. 1982). 
 167 840 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 168 Id. at 775. 
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to “satisfy the ‘unity of interest and ownership’ element of piercing 
the corporate veil.”
169
  The court reasoned that: 
[S]tock ownership, while important, is not a prerequisite to pierc-
ing the corporate veil but is merely one factor to be considered in 
evaluating the entire situation. . . . [T]he key factor in any deci-
sion to disregard the separate corporate entity is the element of 
control or influence exercised by the individual sought to be held 
liable over corporate affairs.
170
 
Colorado has embraced this line of reasoning, first in a 1984 
corporate case, LaFond v. Basham,
171
 more recently in a case involving 
an LLC, Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge,
172
 and in another involving a 
corporation, McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger.
173
  A close analysis of 
these Colorado cases demonstrates both the weakness of the “equita-
ble ownership” doctrine and the likelihood that an alternative basis 
for finding liability was present in the cases. 
LaFond appears to be the first Colorado case holding a non-
shareholder liable for a corporate debt on a piercing theory.
174
  It in-
 
 169 Id. at 777 (citing Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1051 
(2d Cir. 1997); In re MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326, 332–33 (D. Mass. 1990); Angelo Tomas-
so, Inc., 447 A.2d at 412; Establissement Tomis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F. 
Supp. 1355, 1366 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 
619, 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)). 
 170 Angelo Tomasso, Inc., 447 A.2d at 412.  New York is another jurisdiction that has 
embraced the notion of equitable ownership.  In Freeman, the plaintiff sought to hold 
defendant Mr. Glazier liable for the obligations of Complex Computing Company 
(“C3”) despite Glazier not being a C3 employee, officer, director, or shareholder.  
Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1046.  C3 was incorporated after Columbia University refused to 
license the computer software that Glazier co-developed to a corporation in which 
Glazier had an ownership interest.  Id.  To get around this, Glazier arranged for a 
friend to be C3’s sole shareholder and initial director, while Glazier was hired by C3 
as an independent contractor.  Id.  The district court found that, for all intents and 
purposes, Glazier dominated and controlled C3 and held the only valuable interest 
in C3.  Id. at 1048.  The appellate court rejected Glazier’s argument that because he 
was “not a shareholder, officer, director, or employee of C3,” the plaintiff could not 
pierce the corporate veil and hold Glazier liable.  Id. at 1051.  The court reasoned 
that New York courts recognize the doctrine of equitable owner, and “to regard 
[Glazier] as anything but the sole stockholder and controlling person of C3 would be 
to exalt form over substance.”  Id. at 1052 (internal quotes omitted).  But, while the 
C3’s veil could be pierced and Glazier held liable, the court remanded the case to 
determine whether Glazier used his control “to commit a fraud or other wrong that 
resulted in unjust loss or injury to Freeman.”  Id. at 1053. 
 171 683 P.2d 367, 369–70 (Colo. App. 1984).  
 172 211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 173 221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 174 The court in LaFond cited only Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367 (Colo. 
App. 1977) as precedent for its holding, see LaFond, 683 P.2d at 369, but the defen-
dant in Rosebud was a shareholder, see Rosebud, 561 P.2d at 369. 
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volved a garden-variety problem; homeowners were aggrieved when 
their home remodelers (two Colorado corporations) breached their 
agreement.
175
  Finding the corporation without assets, the homeown-
ers sued the individual who “ran” the corporations, Basham, although 
he was not a shareholder (instead, his wife and son were).
176
  LaFond 
announced a new and rather broad rule of law: 
A corporate entity may be disregarded and corporate directors 
may be held personally liable if equity so requires. . . . If adhe-
rence to the corporate fiction would promote injustice, protect 
fraud, defeat a legitimate claim, or defend crime, the invocation of 
equitable principles for the imposition of personal liability may 
occur.
177
 
Read literally, if a creditor’s claim is unpaid, equity requires that di-
rectors be held personally liable.
178
  Such a rule, however, would prac-
tically eliminate the concept of limited liability.  Moreover, until the 
recent cases of Sheffield and McCallum, LaFond has had no influence 
on the development of the law. 
LaFond could have been litigated on the narrower grounds dis-
cussed above—fraudulent transfer and unauthorized distribution.
179
  
The court noted in the opinion that “[w]hen the corporations ar-
rived at virtual insolvency status, [Basham] demanded, to the detri-
ment of other creditors, payment upon his notes, which allegedly 
were due him at the time, and he took over corporate assets to the 
detriment of other creditors, including the LaFonds.”
180
  These find-
ings suggest a strong case against Basham on statutory grounds and 
under the corporate trust doctrine.  Yet the judgment was solely on 
veil-piercing grounds, and Basham was liable for the breach of con-
tract damages suffered by the plaintiffs, with no indication of the 
amount of improper distributions to him.
181
 
The court in McCallum employed the reasoning in LaFond to 
hold corporate manager, Marc Winger, liable.
182
  The plaintiff had 
 
 175 LaFond, 683 P.2d at 368. 
 176 Id.  
 177 Id. at 369 (emphasis added). 
 178 The federal district court, in one of the few cases to cite to LaFond, recognized 
this problem: “The court agrees that any equitable doctrine must be narrowly ap-
plied, else the time-honored presumption against imposing personal liability on of-
ficers and directors be eroded.”  Marriner v. Nation-Wide Horse Transp., Inc., No. 
Civ.03-808-MO, 2004 WL 2203297, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2004).  
 179 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 180 LaFond, 683 P.2d at 369. 
 181 See id. at 369. 
 182 McCallum Family LLC v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 69 (Colo. App. 2009).  
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leased property to the corporation, Manitoba, and, although all lease 
payments were made, the corporation failed to pay property taxes as 
required under the lease.
183
  The lessor paid the taxes and obtained a 
judgment against the corporation for the payment.
184
  When the 
judgment against the corporation went unsatisfied, the plaintiff 
sought to recover from Winger on a piercing theory.
185
  Winger ma-
naged the corporation, but he was not an officer, director, or share-
holder.
186
  His wife and mother-in-law, however, each owned fifty per-
cent of the outstanding stock and were the corporation’s sole officers 
and directors.
187
  Winger ran the corporation with apparently no over-
sight from his wife or mother-in-law, had used corporate funds to pay 
personal expenses, and otherwise “abused” the corporate form.
188
 
While the trial court concluded that veil piercing was inappro-
priate, the court of appeals, after marching dutifully through the 
three-prong test applied in Colorado,
189
 concluded that plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case for veil piercing and remanded the case 
to the trial court for further proceedings.
190
  The appellate court con-
cluded that Winger was an equitable owner of the corporation and its 
alter ego and that because he diverted corporate funds for his own 
purposes, failing to pierce the corporate veil would defeat plaintiff’s 
“rightful claim.”
191
  These facts were sufficient to satisfy the first two 
veil-piercing tests, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court 
 
 183 Id. at 72.  
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 McCallum, 221 P.3d at 72.  
 189 Id. at 74.  
To determine whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil, a 
court must make a three-part inquiry.  First, the court must determine 
whether the corporate entity is the “alter ego” of the person or entity in 
issue. . . . Second, the court must determine whether justice requires 
recognizing the substance of the relationship between the person or 
entity sought to be held liable and the corporation over the form be-
cause the corporate fiction was “used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a 
rightful claim.” . . . Third, the court must consider whether an equita-
ble result will be achieved by disregarding the corporate form and 
holding a shareholder or other insider personally liable for the acts of 
the business entity. . . . All three prongs of the analysis must be satis-
fied. The paramount goal of piercing the corporate veil is to achieve an 
equitable result. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
 190 Id. at 74, 80. 
 191 Id. at 79. 
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to exercise its equitable discretion to determine whether to pierce the 
corporate veil.
192
 
This conclusion of the appellate court was rather remarkable in 
light of the findings of the lower court, which the appellate court 
summarized: 
Here, the trial court noted that Marc Winger did not sign 
the lease; no evidence was presented that he conspired with his 
father or anyone else to mismanage Manitoba or divert its assets 
to avoid its liability under the lease; there was no evidence that 
McCallum [the creditor] had investigated Manitoba’s financial 
circumstances before renting to it; and ‘Manitoba apparently 
lived up to its obligations under the lease (except for paying . . . 
property taxes) for four or five years.’
193
 
It seems that Winger withdrew money from the corporation for per-
sonal purposes, but these withdrawals could be characterized as com-
pensation.  The informality with which the business was run should 
not be the basis for holding its manager personally liable, but that 
was essentially what the appellate court was suggesting.  Because the 
corporation was insolvent, the creditor had the option of filing a 
claim against the corporation’s directors for breach of their fiduciary 
duty to the corporation.
194
  Any recovery would go to the corporation 
to be available to all of the corporation’s creditors.
195
  If a defendant 
unlawfully diverted corporate resources to himself, that claim may be 
pursued by the creditors in the same action under the rubric of frau-
dulent transfers or breach of fiduciary duty.
196
  But these actions limit 
the exposure of entity managers to the amounts wrongfully paid, not 
to all liabilities of the entity.
197
  These causes of action are more close-
ly designed to address the loss suffered and better suited to the facts 
of McCallum. 
LaFond was also the basis for extending veil-piercing liability to 
managers of an LLC in Sheffield
198
 and, as in LaFond and McCallum, the 
extension of liability appears to be unwarranted.  Sheffield involved an 
LLC that had a “subdivision agreement” with the City of Broomfield 
under which it was obligated to improve lots it owned as a condition 
 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 78.  
 194 See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 80 (noting that plaintiffs could file such a claim un-
der prior precedent but holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the 
claim). 
 195 See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 196 See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 80. 
 197 See In re Amdura Corp, 75 F.3d 1447, 1452 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 198 See Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 2009). 
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to obtaining a building permit.
199
  Prior to completing these im-
provements, the LLC agreed to sell the subject lots to the plaintiff 
and represented in the sales agreement that the improvements had 
been made.
200
  After the closing, the plaintiff sued for breach and 
sought to hold the LLC manager personally liable for the damages 
arising from the breach of contract.
201
  The trial court held in favor of 
the defendant-manager, reasoning that only LLC members can be 
held liable on a piercing theory.
202
 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed this holding in a 
strange opinion.
203
  Colorado, like many other jurisdictions, has a 
provision in its LLC statute that permits veil-piercing claims against 
“members.”
204
  The Colorado court ruled, however, that this statutory 
claim did not preclude a common-law claim for veil piercing and, 
under the common law of Colorado (citing only LaFond), a manager 
of an LLC may be held liable for the obligations of the company if 
the veil-piercing criteria are present.
205
  As the lower court dismissed 
the veil-piercing claim, the case was remanded for a determination of 
whether these criteria were in fact present.
206
  The appellate court, 
however, clearly suggested that veil piercing was appropriate, noting 
how the defendant acted to “frustrate the . . . creditors” and enrich 
himself.
207
 
Sheffield is a good example of why veil piercing is a troubling doc-
trine.  The plaintiff’s claim was one for damages for breach of repre-
sentation, and the plaintiff, by his own admission, was a sophisticated 
real estate developer who should have known of the misrepresenta-
tion.
208
  Indeed, plaintiff had sued the defendant on an individual 
claim for negligent misrepresentation but failed because the court 
concluded that plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation was not 
reasonable; he should have made inquiry of the city before closing on 
 
 199 Id. at 717. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 718.  
 202 Id. at 718–19. 
 203 See id. at 721. 
 204 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107(1) (2010) (“In any case in which a party seeks to 
hold the members of a[n LLC] personally responsible for the alleged improper ac-
tions of the [LLC], the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions 
and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced 
under Colorado law.”). 
 205 Sheffield, 211 P.3d at 721–22. 
 206 Id. at 722. 
 207 Id. at 719. 
 208 See id. at 718.  
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the transaction.
209
  Thus, plaintiff’s claim is against an individual 
manager for breach of representation by an entity when the facts in-
dicate that the plaintiff unreasonably relied on that representation (if 
he relied on it at all).  Put differently, the court remakes the contract 
by suggesting that the defendant might be personally liable on the 
LLC’s misrepresentation, thereby giving the plaintiff far more than 
he bargained for. 
To the extent that the defendant made improper distributions 
from the LLC, there are, as in other veil-piercing cases, ample doc-
trines to address the conduct.  There are strong suggestions in the 
opinion that the defendant’s actions constituted fraudulent transfers 
and, if so, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides a remedy.
210
  
Moreover, as in LaFond, the statutory provision for unlawful distribu-
tions and the corporate trust fund doctrine provided plaintiff with 
remedies.
211
  Indeed, the Sheffield court held that the corporate trust 
fund doctrine may be applied to impose personal liability on the 
manager of an LLC who favors his own claims when distributing LLC 
assets, if the company was insolvent or rendered insolvent when the 
distribution was made.
212
 
These doctrines came together in another recent Colorado case, 
Colborne Corp. v. Weinstein, where a creditor brought a claim against 
the members and managers of a Colorado LLC.
213
  The claim against 
the members alleged that they received a distribution from the LLC 
that rendered the company insolvent and the distribution, therefore, 
was recoverable by the creditor under a provision of Colorado’s LLC 
act.
214
  Against the managers, the creditor claimed that those distribu-
tions favored managers and were, therefore, in violation of the trust 
doctrine.
215
  The appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on both 
claims.
216
  As to the first claim, the court noted that the Colorado LLC 
act provides that the unlawful distribution is recoverable by the 
LLC.
217
  Nevertheless, the court held that the creditor had standing to 
maintain this claim, consistent with precedents that allowed corpo-
rate creditors to maintain claims against corporate shareholders un-
 
 209 Id. at 725. 
 210 See id. at 721–22. 
 211 See Sheffield, 211 P.3d at 721–22. 
 212 Id. at 723. 
 213 No. 09CA0724, 2010 WL 185416, at *1 (Colo. App. Jan. 21, 2010). 
 214 Id.   
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at *2–4. 
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der a similar statute because the managers of the LLC had no incen-
tive to maintain a claim against themselves.
218
 
On the corporate trust doctrine claim, the appellate court relied 
on Sheffield.
219
  Interestingly, no piercing claim was brought against 
the members or managers in Colborne, although the facts suggest that 
one might have succeeded.
220
  Whether there were other facts that 
undermined such a claim, or the lawyers overlooked the claim, it is 
noteworthy that the creditor got full relief without it.
221
 
In short, then, statutory provisions and a common-law doctrine 
all protect entity creditors from the risk that those who control the 
entity will favor their own claims against the entity or otherwise 
enrich the entity’s owners to the detriment of creditors.  Veil piercing 
is an overlay on these doctrines that potentially expands this liability 
and does so in an unpredictable and haphazard manner. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
LaFond, Sheffield, and McCallum each demonstrate the ad hoc 
quality of veil piercing and the lack of an underlying rationale to jus-
tify the doctrine.  The doctrine of veil piercing is grounded on a no-
tion that the state has granted the owners of a business the privilege 
of operating the business with the assurance of limited liability in ex-
change for which those owners must operate that business as a sepa-
rate entity.  If owners fail to adhere to that bargain, thereby “abusing” 
the privilege, they risk the loss of that limited liability.  When non-
owners are held liable for the entity’s debts, it cannot be said that 
they abused any privilege, as they were never granted one.  Moreover, 
these cases sharply demonstrate the absence of causation in veil 
piercing.  Plaintiff’s loss in Sheffield was, at best, caused by a misrepre-
sentation, and in LaFond and McCallum the plaintiffs’ losses were the 
result of illegal distributions.
222
  In no case was the plaintiff’s loss 
caused by defendant’s failure to recognize the separate existence of 
the entity. 
The effect of extending liability to non-owners is to increase the 
risk of personal liability to employees and other actors in an entity 
and to continue the erosion of the limited liability concept.  All this 
comes at a cost: employees will require a risk premium and promo-
 
 218 Id. at *4. 
 219 Colborne Corp, 2010 WL 185416, at *5.  
 220 See id. 
 221 See id. at *5–6. 
 222 See discussion of cases supra Part III.B. 
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ters of limited liability entities face greater uncertainty.  More impor-
tantly, carefully crafted legislative solutions are mooted and replaced 
by fuzzy judicially created doctrines.  The tendency of courts—and, in 
a few cases, legislatures
223
—to extend the veil-piercing doctrine to 
LLCs only compounds these problems.  The questions of whether 
and when owners and managers of limited liability entities should be 
liable for the entity’s debts is one that calls for a legislative, not judi-
cial, resolution.  Arguably, state legislatures have addressed this ques-
tion in multiple ways.  Nevertheless, the tendency of state courts to 
modify business entity statutes continues and, in the area of veil pierc-
ing, profoundly so. 
 
 
 223 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 
(2010). 
